Case Summaries

[02/03] Lawson v. FMR, LLC
In two separate but related cases under the whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, alleging unlawful retaliation by employers that are private companies that act under contract as advisers to and managers of mutual funds organized under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the district court's denial of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim is reversed, as the whistleblower protection afforded by section 806(a) of the Act applies only to the employees of public companies as defined in the Act, and not to an employee of a contractor or subcontractor of a public company reporting suspected violations relating to fraud against shareholders of the public company.

[01/26] The DIRECTV Group, Inc. v. US
In a case involving the calculation and payment of segment closing adjustments associated with a corporation's sale of certain business units that included the transfer of defined benefit pension plans, the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims granting summary judgment in favor of the corporation is affirmed, where: 1) the Claims Court did not err by calculating segment closing adjustments based on the assets and liabilities of the entire segment, rather than only the assets and liabilities that the corporation retained; and 2) the Claims Court correctly determined that the corporation's segment closing obligations could be satisfied by the cost savings realized by the government in the successor contracts.

[01/24] TIFD III-E, Inc. v. US
In a suit by a taxpayer partner challenging IRS notices of adjustment reallocating a large percentage of the partnership's income for the years 1993 to 1998 to the taxpayer away from two Dutch banks that had purchased an interest in the partnership, and imposing a penalty for underpayment, the district court's judgment in favor of the taxpayer is reversed, where: 1) the banks' interest was not a capital interest for purposes of qualifying them as partners within the meaning of IRC section 704(e)(1); and 2) the taxpayer failed to point to substantial authority supporting its position, so that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income.

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[02/01] In re American Express Merchants' Litigation
In a class action asserting Sherman Act claims, brought against a charge card issuer whose card acceptance agreement purported to preclude a merchant from bringing a class action lawsuit, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration and dismissal of the case is reversed, where the cost of plaintiffs' individually arbitrating their dispute with the defendant would be prohibitive, effectively depriving them of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws, and thus the class action waiver in the arbitration provision was unenforceable.

[01/27] C9 Ventures v. SVC-West, L.P.
In a personal injury suit in which a lessor of helium-filled tanks used to inflate festive balloons cross-complained against the lessee to enforce an indemnification provision on the back of an unsigned invoice, the trial court's judgment in favor of the lessor and award of attorney fees to it is reversed, where: 1) the lessee did not manifest assent to the terms on the back of the unsigned invoice by course of dealing or course of performance, or under basic contract law; 2) the lessee did not sign the invoice or otherwise expressly agree to its terms; 3) an unsigned invoice itself is not a contract, and repeated delivery of a particular form does not make the form part of the parties' agreement; 4) payment of the invoice merely constituted the lessee's performance of the obligation under the oral contract to pay for the rental of the helium-filled tanks; and 5) assuming the transaction was a sale of goods covered by division 2 of the California Commercial Code, the indemnification provision was not an additional term of the contract under section 2207 of the Commercial Code.

[01/24] Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A. Inc.
In a putative class action against a men's clothing retailer alleging that its printing of “EXPIRY: 04/##” on a credit card receipt willfully violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)'s prohibition against printing the expiration date of the a credit card upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale, the district court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where: 1) FACTA prohibits a merchant from printing expiration date information on a receipt provided to the consumer, even if the year is redacted; but 2) the defendant's interpretation of FACTA, although erroneous, was at least objectively reasonable, and thus there was no "willful" violation that could support a claim.

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[02/02] Gentry v. Siegel
In bankruptcy proceedings in which former employees of the debtor filed claims for unpaid overtime wages, the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of a Rule 9014 motion and its refusal to allow the claimants to pursue class actions is affirmed, where: 1) the bankruptcy court was within its discretion to rule that the bankruptcy process would provide a process superior to the class action process for resolving the claims of former employees; 2) notice of the bankruptcy process to the named claimants was not constitutionally deficient; and 3) with respect to unnamed claimants, the named claimants lacked standing to challenge the notice.

[01/30] Matter of Thorpe Insulation Co.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's orders denying a creditor's motion to compel arbitration and disallowing its claim is affirmed, where: 1) the resolution of the creditor's claim was a core matter in the bankruptcy; 2) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the creditor's motion to compel arbitration; 3) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give the creditor further opportunity for discovery; 4) the creditor's claim was properly disallowed because because the debtor's covenants in a settlement agreement were purported prepetition waivers of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code, which need not be permitted.

[01/27] Matter of Meruelo Maddux Properties, Inc.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings involving the question whether the debtor was subject to the single asset real estate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the district court's holding that the single asset real estate provisions applied is affirmed, where: 1) the debtor, which existed solely to operate a 92-unit apartment complex, could be characterized as a single asset real estate debtor under the Bankruptcy Code; 2) the plain language of the Code gives no basis for a "whole business enterprise" exception to single asset real estate debtor status that would allow the court to consider parent corporation and sister subsidiaries; and 3) the district court did not err in its approach to granting relief from the automatic stay by leaving questions about whether the debtor timely took timely corrective action to the bankruptcy court in the first instance.

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[02/01] GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office L.P. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
In a suit alleging breach of lease agreements that the defendant bank assumed after it purchased a failed bank's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to the terms of a written purchase and assumption agreement, the district court's grant of the bank's motion to dismiss is affirmed, where under federal common law, the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit under the agreement because it was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the agreement.

[01/24] TIFD III-E, Inc. v. US
In a suit by a taxpayer partner challenging IRS notices of adjustment reallocating a large percentage of the partnership's income for the years 1993 to 1998 to the taxpayer away from two Dutch banks that had purchased an interest in the partnership, and imposing a penalty for underpayment, the district court's judgment in favor of the taxpayer is reversed, where: 1) the banks' interest was not a capital interest for purposes of qualifying them as partners within the meaning of IRC section 704(e)(1); and 2) the taxpayer failed to point to substantial authority supporting its position, so that the government was entitled to impose a penalty on the taxpayer for substantial understatement of income.

[01/20] CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon
In proceedings following default on a standby letter of credit, the district court's disposition of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment is reversed and the case remanded, where: 1) the district court incorrectly concluded that the applicant for the letter of credit was a surety and erroneously permitted it to assert the defense of discharge; and 2) the applicant was not entitled to an award of damages because the beneficiary's draw on the letter of credit did not violate the statutory warranty to the applicant that the drawing did not violate any agreement between the applicant and the beneficiary.

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